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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
TROY LABRUM, : Case No. 970099-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-2 03.1 provides: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
-- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons 
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used 
in this section means the defendant and two or more 
other persons would be criminally liable for the 
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if 
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases 
or the information or indictment in felony cases 
notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and 
in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included 
initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to 
include the subscription if the court finds the 
charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of 
the allegation he committed the offense in concert 
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the 
defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 180 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which 
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 
37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-related 
offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in 
Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related 
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(I) any offense of obstructing government 
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation 
of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 3; 
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(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 
10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and 
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76 Chapter : 10, Part 
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
In) communications fraud as defined i n Section 
76-10-18 0] ; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction 
Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in 
Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a* This section does not. create any separate 
offense but provides =»;: enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense, 
(b* . \ ".- - • :rposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with 
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or 
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty 
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing 
judge that this section is applicable. In 
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of the sentence required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be 
best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying 
the disposition on the record and :i n writing. 
Ut " u '" " - " / 6 - 2 - 2 0 2 (1 9 9 5 ) j: •] < :> < ri des ; : 
7 -202. Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for conduct of a 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
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encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of las; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
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Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
proi n des : 
Sec, 12. [Rights of accused persons,] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused, person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to 
a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing In this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute -^r rule. 
Article I, section 3 3 of the Utah Constitution.. 
provides: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment --
Grand j ury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent 
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment The formation of the grand 
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jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
BACK SEAT PASSENGER COMMITTED ANY CRIME TO 
SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT 
HERE. 
The State has established the following: 
1. That Mr. Behunin was in the house where 
he, Mr. Labrum, Joe Kelly, and Kevin McCray resided, 15 
to 20 feet away from a conversation, when Mr. Mills and 
Mr. Labrum asked Joe Kelly if they could borrow his car 
to "go shoot somebody." This conversation was audible 
at a distance of "no more than ten feet" where Mr. 
McCray was standing, but there is no evidence that it 
was audible at 15 to 2 0 feet, that Mr. Behunin was 
paying attention to the conversation, or that Mr. 
Behunin heard the conversation. R. 285-8. 
2. That Mr. Behunin left with Mr. Mills and 
Mr. Labrum some hour and a half later. R. 288, 289. 
3. That Mr. Behunin was with Mr. Mills and 
Mr. Labrum at the time of the shooting. R. 211. 
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Section 76-2-202 provides that a person who "directly 
commits the offense, who s-~"!:c^4 •" requests, commands, 
encourages = .^r nerson to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as - r-arty for such conduct . " The State has shown no crimi na] 
< " j.ici .1 I 1 HI: - ~ i . 
It is undisputed tnat v:. Behunin did not directly 
commit the offense, L:-brum was charged with ana cor/;; - f 
be_:.-. ~gg- " -:-^  Aate produced no evidence at z:..^. or 
sentencing that behunin solicited, requested, commanded, or 
encouraqed - h*7 shooting The State has only shown 
alonj .... • . .ie, proi>a^-/ without knowledge or :ne planned 
shooting i.\----. . ; :•. Behunin was aware 01 the plan, being aware 
of d planned offense is nc *" •= ~ -.; - •: - 1 
person to " ..a::, .. .tv under «.. *A/^. . 
Final.../, v- Behunin did not aia ' -:he r ffense. The 
backseat: passenoei was entirely ,: ;.- -^---.~5>- * - — ..^c^ ^nd 
did nc:::::.; lookout was needed; evidence indicated that 
Mr. Behunm wa- acting as a lookout. No evidence indicates that 
Mr. Behunin selected the target ' 'i " jiinti.-i, LLL i . dl.'u.ih >r 
otherwise assisted i n the shooting, AJ 1 thai has been shown is 
passive presence. 
"Mere presence, or even ri'-i - VT 
one an accomplice when he neither aa;.j«..- .stigates, 
encourages, 01 assists in perpetration of the crime " State v. 
Kerekes , 622 P 2 d I! 3 61 ] 3 6 6 (IJt ah ] 9 8 0 ) (c j j: inq State v. Gee, 
7 
498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972)); accord State v. Ferticr, 233 P.2d 347, 
349 (Utah 1951) ("Mere presence combined with knowledge that a 
crime is about to be committed or a mental approbation while the 
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act, will not of 
itself constitute one an accomplice."). See Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (A 
"person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable 
cause to search that person."), Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
51-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (mere presence 
in a neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 
593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) ("Presumptions of 
guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings."); 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable 
suspicion where man walking near defendant had run away). 
The State seeks to infer both the actus reus and the 
mens rea of a criminal act by Mr. Behunin from his association 
with others and mere presence at the scene of a crime. But 
entire criminal acts may not be inferred from association with 
criminals. The evidence to support imposition of the gang 
enhancement is insufficient, as no showing has been made that a 
third person "would be criminally liable for the offense" as a 
party under §76-2-202. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (b) . 
Evidence that Mr. Behunin may have been staring or 
flashing gang signs does not establish a crime. Staring and gang 
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signs are not necessary precursors to a drive by shooting or 
attempted homicide. After the fact "gloating," R. 302, does not 
constitute a crime. Millions celebrated the death of Adolf 
Hitler, but this does not make them criminally responsible for 
his death. The State relies only on Mr. Behunin's presence and 
his association with Messrs. Mills and Labrum to show that he 
might have committed a crime for which the State has no evidence. 
"Arguing, as the State does, that speculative inferences can 
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of 
the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its core." State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993). 
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence 
is well settled: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant 
must cover the gap between the presumption of innocence 
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to 
review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does 
not mean that the court can take a speculative leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be 
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State in re J.S.H., 642 P.2d 386 
(Utah 1982); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 
(Utah 1980). 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-5 (Utah 1983). The fabric 
here is stretched so thin, and is so full of holes, that it could 
not serve as a dishrag. There is no evidence establishing 
criminal conduct by Mr. Behunin. 
The facts of Petree are illustrative. The body of a 
teenaged girl was found in an unusual position in a shallow grave 
9 
in Cedar City, together with her clothing, jewelry, and a pair of 
boxer shorts. 659 P.2d at 444. Defendant, a neighbor, was the 
last person seen with the victim. Id. at 445. Several hours 
after dropping the victim off, her mother inquired of defendant 
where she was and he replied that she left with someone he did 
not know. Id. The evening the victim disappeared, defendant 
called his sister in Las Vegas saying "'he was getting a hassle 
at home and in school and he wanted to come down.'" Id. His 
sister went to Cedar City and picked him up. Id. at 44 9. 
Defendant stayed with his sister in Las Vegas for four days. Id. 
at 445. While there, defendant told his sister of a "nightmare 
about walking with a girl and she slapped him and that's all he 
remembered, and then waking up taking a bath and her folks, the 
girl's folks pounding on the door wanting to know where she was." 
Id. "'Later he said he thought he had hurt or killed a girl, but 
he wasn't sure.'" Id. at 446. More than two years later, 
defendant mentioned to a girlfriend that "he had gotten into a 
fight with a girl in Utah. He didn't mention any names. And he 
came home and he couldn't remember nothing afterwards." Id. at 
447 & n.4. The Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to 
establish that defendant killed the victim, or that he did so 
intentionally or knowingly. 
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), a 
search warrant was executed against the home of a husband and 
wife, yielding 4 marijuana plants, two paper bags containing 
marijuana and hashish, and sundry other items. The husband 
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stated, "My wife doesn't know anything about this. I just came 
home with everything." State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1259 
(Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the wife 
for insufficient evidence: 
[T] he facts as stipulated in this casen consist of a 
confirmation that the defendants owned and resided in 
the house where the warrant search was made, a list of 
the items found in that search, most of which were 
enclosed in two brown paper bags, and the statement 
made by defendant Carl Anderton that his wife knew 
nothing about the drugs and that he had just returned 
home with them. The only other relevant evidence in 
the record consists of testimony regarding the amounts 
of marijuana and hashish generally kept by an 
individual for personal use. [] There is no evidence as 
to where in the home the drugs were found or where the 
defendant Lana Anderton was when the officers entered 
the house. Moreover, there is no evidence of any 
incriminating conduct or statements of Lana Anderton. 
Thus, there is nothing which establishes that the drugs 
were in her view, accessible or even close to her, or 
that she was participating in the use of the drugs or 
knew of their presence in the house. 
Similarly, there is no evidence in the record 
which shows Lana Anderton's knowing or intentional 
involvement in the production of marijuana. The only 
evidence is that of joint residence in the home where 
the plants were found; there is nothing to establish 
how long the plants had been there or where they were 
found. 
When the facts of this case are considered, 
particularly in light of the cases cited above, it 
requires a "leap of faith" to find that Lana Anderton 
is guilty solely on the basis of her marital 
relationship with her husband and their joint occupancy 
of the home. 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264-5 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., 
joined by Stewart and Howe, JJ). So here, Mr. Behunin cannot be 
found criminally responsible merely because he lived with 
appellant and was present in the car at the time of the crime. 
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The evidence here is not even as strong as that in 
Petree and Anderton, and establishes at most only probable cause. 
"A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 
(Utah 1993) . The State relies on nothing more here. The gang 
enhancement sentence must be vacated. 
POINT II. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS ACCORDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point II.B., pp. 
14-22) 
A. RAMIREZ DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES 
RAISED HERE. 
On November 14, 1997, this Court issued its opinion in 
State v. Ramirez, 330 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah App. 1997) 
(Wilkins, A.P.J., joined by Davis, P.J., and Jackson, J.). 
Ramirez addressed whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 violated a 
defendant's right to trial by jury under the sixth amendment. In 
a footnote this Court clarified: 
We address only the narrow question of whether 
requiring the sentencing judge to make the factual 
determination required by section 76-3-203.1 violates 
the Sixth Amendment. We do not address the general 
application of the statute. 
330 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21 n.5. While related, the sixth amendment 
challenge made in Ramirez is distinct from the challenges made 
here: (1) that the gang enhancement statute exceeds the 
permissible bounds of offense definition under the due process 
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clauses of the state and federal constitutions; (2) that the 
statute violates substantive due process, federal equal 
protection, and state uniform operation of laws because it is not 
applied in accordance with its legislative intent; and (3) that 
the statute is void for vagueness under the due process clauses 
because it does not adequately constrain judicial discretion and 
require judges to apply the enhancement only to criminal street 
gang members. 
This Court should also note, as set forth in the 
State's brief at p. 14-15 n.8, these constitutional challenges 
are currently pending before the Supreme Court in State v. 
Cameron Lopes, No. 960551 (Utah, argued Nov. 12, 1997). 
B. IN CONCERT ACTIVITY IS DEFINED AS THE 
SEPARATE OFFENSE OF CONSPIRACY UNDER 
UTAH LAW. 
The State asserts that "the Utah legislature did not 
define acting in concert as a separate offense." State's brief 
at 17. This is not so. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995), 
enacted by 1973 Utah Laws ch. 196, sets forth the elements of 
conspiracy.1 In any case where a gang enhancement is sought, the 
State could instead charge the defendant with the underlying 
offense and conspiracy. In such a situation, the defendant would 
be entitled to a preliminary hearing and a jury would make the 
xOne notable difference between conspiracy and the gang 
enhancement is that a conspiracy conviction requires only one co-
conspirator, whereas application of the gang enhancement requires 
two additional in-concert actors. 
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determination of guilt. Upon conviction, a separate sentence 
would be imposed. 
Of particular note is that, in addition to losing all 
of the constitutional protections attendant to a criminal 
prosecution for conspiracy (e.g. preliminary hearing, jury 
determination, application of evidentiary rules), the defendant 
receives a stiffer sentence under the gang enhancement than under 
a conviction for both the offense and conspiracy to commit the 
offense. Utah's sentencing guidelines set forth the presumptive 
term of incarceration under Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
system. See Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Utah Court 
Rules Annotated at Appendix D (p. 1303 et seg.). Here, if Mr. 
Labrum had been convicted of both attempted homicide and 
conspiracy to commit murder, he would have received two 1 to 15 
year sentences.2 In the worst case scenario of on offender in 
the poor criminal history category, applied consecutively the 
second sentence would add 18 months to his presumptive sentence 
of 36 months for a total of 4% years. In the best case scenario 
of an offender in the excellent criminal history category, 
applied concurrently the second sentence would add 9 months to 
his presumptive sentence of 18 months for a total of 2V* years. 
See Sentence and Release Guidelines, Form 4 (attached as Appendix 
2In the normal case, conspiracy to commit the underlying 
offense would be a felony of a lower degree than the underlying 
offense. For example, if a person were convicted of murder and 
conspiracy to commit murder, he or she would have a first and 
second degree conviction, rather than two first degree convictions. 
Here, Mr. Labrum was only convicted of attempted homicide, thus the 
conspiracy offense is a felony of the same degree. 
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A). Under the gang enhancement, the minimum term is increased to 
6 years, significantly longer than even the worst case scenario 
for a consecutive conspiracy conviction. Similar results occur 
for application of the gang enhancement in 1st degree and 3rd 
degree felony cases. 
The gang enhancement raises more than "the specter of 
states restructuring crimes to avoid constitutional procedural 
safeguards," State's brief at 19; it is the physical embodiment 
of an actual restructuring specifically designed to avoid the 
constitutionally imposed procedural safeguards inherent in 
conspiracy prosecutions. 
POINT III. APPELLANT'S UNIFORM OPERATION, 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
ARGUMENTS ARE MERITORIOUS. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point III, pp. 23-
30) 
A. MR. LABRUM HAS STANDING TO ASSERT HIS 
CLAIMS THAT THE GANG ENHANCEMENT APPLIES 
TO PERSONS THE LEGISLATURE NEVER 
INTENDED TO TARGET. 
The State asserts that Mr. Labrum falls within the 
group targeted by the legislature for application of the gang 
enhancement, criminal street gang members, and thus lacks 
standing to assert that the enhancement is being applied to 
persons for whom it was not intended. However, the State has no 
reliable evidence upon which to base such a conclusion. 
The State relies on statements in the presentence 
investigation report, R. 628 at p. 3, for its assertion that Mr. 
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Labrum is a criminal street gang member. The PSI indicates that 
the "Official Version . . . is taken from reports of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department." Id. It does not indicate who 
wrote those police reports, or where the information was gathered 
from. 
This is precisely the type of information that the 
Supreme Court held to be insufficiently reliable to form the 
basis of a sentence in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 
1993) : 
In our view, the ISAT report does not rise to 
minimum standards of reliability. The report consists 
solely of double, and even triple, hearsay. For 
example, the ISAT report, which is itself hearsay, 
summarizes the statements made by the niece during the 
interviews. The report then relates a summary of the 
mother's description to the ISAT interviewer of 
statements made by the niece. Although hearsay 
evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding, 
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents 
such a high probability for inaccuracy that it cannot 
stand alone as the basis for sentencing. 
State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993). 
So here, the evidence of gang affiliation is at least 
double hearsay. Someone reported the information to a police 
officer (hearsay), who put it in a report (hearsay), which was 
read by the presentence investigator, and reported (hearsay) in 
the PSI. This information is double and triple hearsay, and "is 
so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for 
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for 
sentencing." Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071. 
Because the State does not have reliable evidence 
establishing that Mr. Labrum falls within the targeted group for 
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application of the gang enhancement, he has standing to pursue 
his claims. 
B. APPELLANT HAS CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THE 
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE. 
Reference to legislative history is necessary and 
appropriate in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute that 
is at odds with its legislative intent. The gang enhancement 
statute is silent with respect to intent. That silence, together 
with the nature of appellant's constitutional attack against the 
statute, compels review of legislative history to assess whether 
the statute accomplishes its legislative purposes and objectives 
in a reasonable manner. 
Courts traditionally review the legislative history of 
statutes challenged on vagueness and due process grounds, since 
the statute must rationally relate to legislative intent. See 
United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 
Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First 
Amendment v. F.C.C., 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991). The 
statute has to be construed in accordance with legislative 
intent: 
The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in 
regard to the interpretation and application of a statute 
is: What was the intent of the legislature?" All other 
rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it and 
are helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining that 
objective. In determining that intent the statute should be 
considered in the light of the purpose it was designed to 
serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if that 
can be done consistent with its language. 
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Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966) 
(footnote and cites omitted); accord Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); Cullum v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange. 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993); Am. Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("This Court's primary 
responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature"); Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846, 847 
(Utah 1967) (primary objective concerning statute is to discover 
.intent and purpose for enactment). 
Indeed, the literal language of a statute must give way 
to the unequivocally expressed intent of the legislature: 
["0]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is 
that the statute should be looked at as a whole and in light 
of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and should 
be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that 
objective. In order to give the statute the implementation 
which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention 
sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness. ["] 
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974 
(1965). 
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987). Accord 
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 
1996) ("we will interpret a statute according to its plain 
language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of 
the statute"). Here, the plain language of the gang enhancement 
is "in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the 
statute," see Legislative History attached as Appendix B to 
opening brief, and must yield. 
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In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 459 (1892), the United States Supreme Court held: 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter 
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not 
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. 
This has been often asserted, and the Reports are full of 
cases illustrating its application. This is not the 
substitution of the will of the judge for that of the 
legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used 
in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in 
question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, 
or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the 
absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning 
to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the 
legislator intended to include the particular act. 
The Supreme Court was interpreting a statute which read: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, 
or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the 
transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the 
importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any 
foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its 
territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or 
agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made 
previous to the importation or migration of such alien or 
aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service 
of any kind in the United States, its territories, or the 
District of Columbia. 
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458. Despite the plain 
language of the statute, the Court held it inapplicable to the 
church, which had arranged for the transport of an Englishman to 
serve as rector and pastor at a church in New York City. The 
legislative history made clear that "the intent of congress was 
simply to stay the influx of [] cheap, unskilled labor." Id. at 
465; accord. United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 
242 (1989); Nat'l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R. R. 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (basic principles of 
statutory construction yield to contrary evidence of legislative 
19 
intent); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 
(1940) : 
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not 
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 
'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a 
whole'[] this Court has followed that purpose, rather than 
the literal words." When aid to construction of the 
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, 
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its 
use, [] however clear the words may appear on 'superficial 
examination. ' [3 
Id. at 543-44 (footnotes and cites omitted); Harrison v. Northern 
Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (there is no rule of law 
forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter 
how clear the words); see also Burlington Northern R. Co. v. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United States v. 
Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) (regard for the 
specific history of the legislative process affords more solid 
ground for giving it meaning). Appellant's reliance on 
legislative history is appropriate and necessary for evaluating 
whether statutory objectives are reasonably and rationally served 
by the statute enacted. Here, the legislative purpose of 
targeting only criminal street gang members is not reasonably and 
rationally served by the statute, rendering the statute 
unconstitutional. 
POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point IV, pp. 30-
37) 
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The State's argument concerning appellant's due process 
vagueness claim is premised on the State's misreading of the 
legislative intent. See Point III, supra, for discussion of why 
this Court must look to the legislative history to determine 
legislative intent. Because the statute was intended to apply 
only to criminal street gang members, and because the legislature 
has relied on the unguided discretion of judges to apply it only 
to criminal street gang members, it is void for vagueness. 
• * * 
Mr. Labrum relies on his opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not expressly addressed here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and his opening brief, Mr. 
Labrum respectfully requests that the gang enhancement imposed 
against him be vacated for insufficient evidence. Alternatively, 
the enhancement should be vacated because the statute is 
unconstitutional. yi 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <- / day of January, 1998. 
•fAKd-— 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KRISTINE M. ROGERS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Form 4 
1309 UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES Appx. D 
Time Matrix — Form 4. 
The time matrix is used to calculate the minimum time if the offender is 
sentenced to prison or jail (not as a condition of probation). If there is only one 
active sentence, the guideline minimum term is determined by simply identi-
fying the cell where the crime severity of the conviction offense intersects 
with the criminal history category. 
If there is more than one active sentence, the first step is to identify the 
most serious offense (the one that carries the sentence with the most time to 
serve remaining). This crime should be intersected with the proper category of 
criminal history (most current calculation). 
Consecutive or concurrent 
Other sentences should be examined to determine if they are, or should be, 
consecutive or concurrent. The guidelines as to when a sentence should be con-
secutive appear in the bottom left hand corner of the page. The guideline en-
hancement for consecutive and concurrent sentences appears in the two rows just 
below the time matrix. These enhancements should all be added together to ar-
rive at the guideline total sentence. 
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